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A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the 5th Circuit ruled on May 12 that 
U.S. District Judge David Hittner (S.D. 
Texas) had correctly granted a motion 
by the defendant employer, to dismiss 
discrimination claims under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
brought by Elijah Anthony Olivarez, a 
transgender man, in connection with 
his discharge on April 27, 2018. On 
May 14, the court withdrew its opinion 
and substituted a new one reaching 
the same conclusion but correcting 
errors in the first opinion concerning 
the applicable Supreme Court standard 
for deciding dismissal motions in 
employment discrimination cases. 
Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge 
James Ho asserted that Olivarez failed 
to state a discrimination claim under 
either statute because he had not alleged 
that any similarly situated employee (a 
“comparator”) had received any more 
favorable treatment than Olivarez.
Olivarez began working as a 
retail store associate for T-Mobile in 
December 2015. He alleges that during 
the first half of 2016, a supervisor 
made “demeaning and inappropriate 
comments” about his transgender status, 
about which he complained to Human 
Resources. He alleges that T-Mobile 
retaliated against him for filing the 
complaint by reducing his hours to 
part-time from September 2016 to 
November 2016. Anticipating surgical 
gender confirmation, Olivarez “stopped 
coming to work” in September 2017 
“in order to undergo egg preservation 
and a hysterectomy,” and the following 
month he “applied retroactively” 
to Broadspire Services, with which 
T-Mobile contracted for administration 
of its leave programs, for medical leave 
to extend to December 2017. A mixture 
of unpaid and paid leave was granted 
through December 31, and extended 
at Olivarez’s request to February 18, 
2018, but a further extension of leave 
was denied in March 2018 and Olivarez 
was discharged on April 27, 2018. He 
filed charges with the EEOC, received 
a right-to-sue letter on August 15, 2019, 
and filed suit against T-Mobile and 
Broadspire on November 12, 2019. 
At the time Olivarez filed suit, 
gender identity discrimination claims 
under Title VII were not recognized as 
such by the 5th Circuit – indeed, Judge 
Ho authored a relevant decision to that 
effect – and artful pleading would be 
necessary to state a claim suing sex 
stereotyping or gender non-conformity 
theories. Transgender law specialist 
Jillian T. Weiss is Olivarez’s counsel 
in the 5th Circuit, but the opinion 
does not note whether his original 
Complaint was file pro se; in any event, 
a First Amended Complaint was filed 
on November 22, 2019. Judge Hittner 
entered a scheduling order on February 
13, 2020, setting a deadline of March 
13 for any further amendment of 
pleadings. At the time, of course, the 
Bostock case had been argued but was 
not yet decided (and ultimately would 
not be decided until June 15, 2020). 
Defendants moved to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim. Their motion 
was denied without prejudice on March 
27, 2020, and Judge Hittner permitted 
Olivarez to file another amended 
complaint, which he did on April 
16, followed by defendants’ renewed 
motion to dismiss on April 30, which 
was granted by Judge Hittner. At the 
time the dismissal motion was granted, 
the Supreme Court had not announced 
its decision in Bostock. After the 
Bostock ruling was announced, 
Olivarez moved to file a new amended 
complaint, but the court denied his 
motion.
Of course, Bostock took away one 
of the defendants’ key arguments, and 
a point of contention on the appeal was 
whether the facts as alleged by Olivarez 
in his last amended complaint were 
sufficient to state a claim under Title 
VII (and the ADA) in light of Bostock. 
The 5th Circuit panel decided they 
were not. Olivarez was not appealing 
the district court’s dismissal of his 
retaliation claim, which had been found 
to be time-barred.
In his original opinion, Judge 
Ho focused on McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 
as setting the standard for pleading a 
disparate treatment claim under Title 
VII in the absence of direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent. In the substituted 
opinion, he acknowledged that the 
pleading standard is now governed 
by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 
U.S. 506 (2002). It is not necessary 
for the plaintiff to meet the standard 
of alleging a prima facie case, as 
described in McDonnell Douglas, but 
rather to allege facts sufficient to state 
claim. However, Judge Ho wrote, the 
McDonnell Douglas pleading standards 
(which go to the question of a prima 
facie case sufficient to shift a burden 
of production to the defendant) remain 
relevant, pursuant to the 5th Circuit’s 
decision in Chhim v. Univ. of Texas 
at Austin, 836 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2016), 
where the court said that the plaintiff 
must “plead sufficient facts on all of 
the ultimate elements of a disparate 
treatment claim to make his case 
plausible.” And, according to Judge Ho, 
Olivarez “has failed to plead any facts 
indicating less favorable treatment than 
others ‘similarly situated’ outside of the 
asserted protected class.” 
Judge Ho asserted that this 
pleading requirement was not altered 
by Bostock. “Olivarez contends that, 
after the district court granted the 
motions to dismiss, Bostock changed 
the law and created a lower standard 
for those alleging discrimination 
based on gender identity. T-Mobile and 
Broadspire argue that Bostock did no 
such thing. We agree with T-Mobile 
and Broadspire. Bostock defined 
sex discrimination to encompass 
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sexual orientation and gender identity 
discrimination. But it did not alter 
the meaning of discrimination itself.” 
And, he concluded, “[at] the summary 
judgment stage, when the claim relies 
on circumstantial evidence, a Title VII 
plaintiff must identify a more favorably 
treated comparator in order to establish 
discrimination. Bostock does not alter 
either of those standards.”
Actually, the assertion that failure 
to allege a more favorably treated 
comparator is necessarily fatal 
to a disparate treatment claim is 
controversial, a point that Ho appears 
to acknowledge in passing earlier in 
the opinion when he writes, “And 
comparator allegations aside, the 
complaint presents no other facts 
sufficient to ‘nudge the claims across 
the line from conceivable to plausible.’” 
This seems to recognize that evidence 
other than comparator evidence might 
satisfy the pleading requirement at 
the motion to dismiss stage in order 
to state a plausible discrimination 
claim. In this case, Olivarez’s previous 
experience with the supervisor who 
made “demeaning and inappropriate 
comments” about his gender identity 
and the subsequent alleged retaliation 
against him when he complained to 
Human Resources might be cited to 
support a claim of discriminatory 
motivation, but the court doesn’t 
mention that, probably due to the 
lack of temporal proximity of those 
incidents to the discharge. Also, there is 
no mention in the opinion whether the 
supervisor who allegedly made those 
remarks had anything to do with the 
discharge decision. 
Judge Ho insists that Bostock 
actually requires comparator evidence, 
focusing on Justice Neil Gorsuch’s 
reasoning for finding that gender 
identity claims are covered under Title 
VII, which was based on hypothetical 
fact patterns involving comparators. 
As to the ADA claim, the court found 
that Olivarez’s complaint fell short by 
failing to allege facts that would support 
an inference that he was fired because 
of a disability. (There is disagreement 
among the federal courts about whether 
gender dysphoria is a disability within 
the meaning of the ADA, because of 
the Helms Amendment that added a 
provision stating that “homosexuality” 
and “transsexualism” are not 
disabilities for purposes of the statute. 
Some courts have opined that gender 
dysphoria, which is a condition distinct 
from “transsexualism,” is not excluded 
from coverage by this language.) “At 
most,” wrote Judge Ho, “Olivarez made 
a conclusory allegation that T-Mobile 
and Broadspire ‘discriminated against 
[Olivarez] based on [a] disability.’ But 
the Rule 8 pleading standard demands 
more than conclusory statements.” 
The court rejected Olivarez’s 
argument that Judge Hittner should have 
allowed the filing of a new amended 
complaint after the Bostock decision 
was announced, but as the court 
rejected the argument that Bostock 
had changed the pleading standard to 
dispense with the necessity to allege 
comparator facts, it found that “there 
is no intervening change of law that 
warrants reconsideration” of the trial 
court’s decision to dismiss the case. The 
judge also pointed out that Olivarez had 
several chances to amend his complaint 
if he could come up with comparator 
evidence, but he never did so.
Judge Ho’s view of the case can be 
summed up by his brief characterization 
of it in the introduction of his 
opinion: “An employer discharged a 
sales employee who happens to be 
transgender – but who took six months 
of leave, and then sought further 
leave for the indefinite future. That is 
not discrimination – that is ordinary 
business practice.” 
Olivarez’s next step could be a 
petition for rehearing en banc, but 
the odds against succeeding in the 5th 
Circuit are fairly long, as twelve of the 
seventeen active judges were appointed 
by Republican presidents, including 
two venerable folks appointed by 
Ronald Reagan in the 1980s who have 
not taken senior status despite their 
age. Donald Trump appointed six of the 
active judges. ■
Arthur S. Leonard is the Robert F. 
Wagner Prof. of Labor and Employment 
Law at New York Law School.
Fourth Circuit 
Rules Prisoners 
Have No Privacy 
Interest in Their 
HIV Information
By William J. Rold
Inmate Christopher N. Payne was 
in a medical dorm in a Virginia prison 
farm when the attending physician 
remarked that he had not been taking 
his HIV medication, within the hearing 
of other inmates, staff, and civilians – 
thereby revealing Payne’s HIV status 
to others. Payne’s claim for violation of 
privacy was dismissed by Senior U.S. 
District Judge Liam O’Grady (E.D. 
Va.) prior to service, on the ground 
that neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Fourth Circuit recognized a right to 
privacy in inmate medical information. 
Payne appealed pro se. 
The Fourth Circuit assigned counsel, 
and it requested adversary briefing 
from defendants. The case was argued, 
and the decision took nine months. 
While the court pretends otherwise, 
the opinion in Payne v. Taslimi, 2021 
U.S. App. LEXIS 15972 (4th Cir., May 
27, 2021), is sweeping in scope: “We 
limit our decision today to the question 
before us: Did Payne have a ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy’ in his HIV 
status while in a prison medical unit? 
We hold that he did not. When Dr. 
Taslimi disclosed his HIV status, Payne 
was in prison, a place where individuals 
have a curtailed expectation of privacy. 
Whatever expectations remain fail to 
include the diagnosis of or medication 
for HIV, a communicable disease. 
The judgment below is therefore 
AFFIRMED.”
Circuit Judge Julius N. Richardson 
(appointed by President Donald J. 
Trump) wrote the opinion. He was 
joined by Circuit Judges Stephanie 
D. Thacken (appointed by President 
Barack Obama) and A. Marvin 
Quattlebaum (appointet by Trump). 
While the judges reject claims under 
the Health Insurance Portability and 
